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arxiv:2611.24362

PIPETTE: Prompt Injection Purple-Teaming for Robust LLM Agents

Published on Nov 18
· Submitted by
Tony He
on Nov 19
Authors:
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Abstract

A novel framework addresses the limitations of current reinforcement learning-based red-teaming methods by employing dictionary learning and on-policy adversarial training to improve the robustness of LLM agents against indirect prompt injection attacks.

Large language model (LLM) agents routinely interact with untrusted external data, exposing them to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks that hijack agents into executing attacker-chosen tasks. To uncover these vulnerabilities at scale, automated red-teaming methods often leverage reinforcement learning (RL) to generate attacks that achieve high attack success rates (ASR). Model developers use the attacks discovered during internal red-teaming to harden agents through adversarial training before deployment, a collaborative offensive-defensive process known in cybersecurity as purple-teaming. However, we show that achieving high ASR during red-teaming does not guarantee robustness gains from subsequent adversarial training. Specifically, we find that two state-of-the-art RL-based red-teaming methods, RL-Hammer and PISmith, suffer from mode collapse, repeatedly discovering similar attack strategies whose additional successes add no additional robustness improvements to adversarial training. To address this gap, we introduce PIPETTE, a unified prompt injection purple-teaming framework that effectively converts red-teaming discoveries into defender robustness improvements. PIPETTE employs a dictionary learning-based reward that encourages broader coverage of attack strategies during red-teaming. It also integrates an on-policy adversarial training pipeline tailored to IPI defense, enabling agents to resist attacks while completing legitimate user tasks. Extensive evaluations across agentic benchmarks (AgentDojo and ASB) demonstrate that PIPETTE produces defenders that achieve near-zero attack success rates on static attacks and can withstand strong adaptive attacks, while maintaining benign task utility close to that of the undefended baseline.

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Model developers use the attacks discovered during internal red-teaming to harden agents through adversarial training before deployment, a collaborative offensive-defensive process known in cybersecurity as purple-teaming. However, we show that achieving high ASR during red-teaming does not guarantee robustness gains from subsequent adversarial training.

Mode collapse in the red-teamer is a neat explanation for why a high attack success rate didn't translate into harder agents: more of the same attack adds nothing to the adversarial training set. For the dictionary-learning part, did you see the new attack strategies keep appearing across training rounds, or did they level off?

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